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Summary 
Natural language ontology is a branch of both metaphysics and linguistics semantic. Its aim is 
to uncover the ontological categories, notions, and structures that are implicit in the use of 
natural language, that is, the ontology that a speaker accepts when using a language. Natural 
language ontology is part of descriptive metaphysics’ to use Strawson’s term or ‘naïve 
metaphysics’ to use Fine’s term, that is, the metaphysics of appearances as opposed to 
foundational metaphysics, whose interest is in what there really is.  
       What sorts of entities natural language involves is closely linked to compositional 
semantics, namely what the contribution of occurrences of expressions in a sentence is taken 
to be. Most importantly entities play a role as semantic values of referential terms, but also as 
implicit arguments of predicates, and as parameters of evaluation.  
      Natural language appears to involve a particularly rich ontology of abstract, minor, 
derivative, and merely intentional objects, an ontology many philosophers are not willing to 
accept. At the same time a serious investigation of the linguistic facts often reveals that 
natural language does not in fact involve the sort of ontology that philosophers had assumed it 
does.  
       Natural language ontology not only concerns with the categories of entities that natural 
language commits itself to, but also with various metaphysical notions, for example the 
relation of part-whole, causation, material constitution, notions of existence, plurality and 
unity, and the mass-count distinction.   
       An important question regarding natural language ontology is what linguistic data it 
should take into account. Looking at the sorts of data that researchers that practice natural 
language ontology have in fact taken into account makes clear that it is only presuppositions, 
not assertions that reflect the ontology implicit in natural language.  
      The ontology of language may be distinctive in that it may in part be driven specifically 
by language or the use of it in a discourse. Pleonastic entities, discourse referents conceived of 
as entities of a sort, and an information-based notion of part structure involved in the 
semantics of plurals and mass nouns would be examples. Finally, there is the question of the 
universality of the ontology of natural language. Certainly the same sort of reasoning should 
apply to consider it universal, in a suitable sense, as has been applied for the case of 
(generative) syntax. 
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1. Natural language ontology: what it is and what issues it raises 
 
It has long been recognized that natural language appears to involve its own ontology. That is, 
there are ontological categories, notions, and structures that appear to be reflected in the 
semantics of various relevant sorts of natural language expressions and constructions. This 
ontology may be quite different from the one that a philosopher may be willing to accept -- 
and even an ‘ordinary’ speaker when reflecting upon what there is. In fact,  natural language 
appears to display a wealth of referential terms, quantifiers, or other expressions involving 
abstract, minor, or derivative entities such as properties, propositions, tropes (that is, 
particularized properties), numbers, degrees, events, facts, worlds or situations, intentional 
objects, and variable objects, entities which all have been considered problematic 
ontologically at one point or another. Natural language thus appears to involve a particularly 
rich ontology of various types of philosophically controversial entities.  
        The fact that natural language appears to involve such a wealth of controversial entities  
has led a number of philosophers to reject natural language as a guide to ‘real’ metaphysics or 
the ontology of what there really is. There are also philosophers, though, throughout the 
history of philosophy, who have appealed to natural language in support of one or another 
metaphysical view, arguing that particular ontological notions are implicit in language itself, 
and thus the way we commonly think. Aristotle has appealed to natural language at times and 
more systematically so medieval philosophers, especially in the Aristotelian tradition, such as 
Ockham and Aquinus. Appeal to natural language was also important in early and not so early 
analytic philosophy, as in the work of Frege, Twardowski, Austin, Vendler, Strawson, and 
Davidson, with a greater or lesser degree of systematicity. More recently, going along with 
the development of contemporary linguistic semantics, appeal to metaphysical notions 
reflected in natural language has not only been made in support of particular philosophical 
arguments but also just in the interest in uncovering the ontology involved in the semantics of 
natural language. Engaging in such a project then is engaging in natural language ontology, as 
a branch of both linguistic semantics and metaphysics.  
     Entities play various sorts of roles in the semantic structure of natural language, given 
various sorts of semantic theories about relevant constructions or expressions.  Most 
importantly, entities play a role as semantic values of referential terms, terms that 
characteristically can support anaphora and be replaced by ordinary quantificational NPs.  But 
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entities may also play a semantic role as implicit arguments of predicates (while not being 
semantic values of referential terms), as contextual parameters of evaluation, and as 
truthmakers. What entities are taken to play a role in the semantics of natural language play a 
role in the semantics of natural language depends very much on the way the contribution of 
occurrences of expressions to the composition of the meaning of the sentence is conceived. 
Thus, generally the contribution of NPs acting as referential terms is taken to be that of 
standing for an object and the role of expressions acting as predicates to take objects as 
arguments and to yield truth values. The ontology of natural language is thus intimately linked 
to compositional semantics, the semantically relevant syntactic roles of expressions in a 
sentences. Here is a brief overview of the sorts of entities of the more controversial types that 
have been argued to be part of the ontology of natural language. 
   Properties have long been considered taking a central stage in the ontology of natural 
language, most obviously as referents of bare nominalizations of adjectives such as wisdom 
(as in Socrates has wisdom), of explicit property-referring terms (the property of wisdom), or 
of gerunds or infinitival clauses (being wise, to be wise).
1
 Properties, though, have also been 
considered the semantic values of predicative complements, and of the quantifiers and 
pronouns that can take their place, as in the valid inference from (1a) to (1b) and the 
possibility of anaphoric reference in (1c): 
 
(1) a. Socrates is wise. 
      b. Socrates is something. 
      c. Plato is that too. 
 
    Also ‘minor’ or ontologically dependent entities such as events and tropes (particularized 
properties) have been regarded part of the ontology of natural language.  
     Events are widely considered playing a central role in semantics ever since Davidson’s 
(1967) seminal paper. Events obviously play the role of semantic values of nouns such as 
laughter, walk, and war. In addition, it has become a standard view in linguistic semantics 
following Davidson (1967) that verbs take events as implicit arguments, with adverbial 
modifiers acting as predicates of such events. Thus the verb walk as below will describe a 
two-place relation between events of walking and agents and slowly will act as a predicate of 
an event argument the sentence existentially quantifiers over:.  
                                                          
1
 For the view that gerunds and infinitival clauses refer to properties see Chierchia/Turner (1988). 
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(2) a. John walked slowly. 
     b. e(walk(e, John) & slowly(e)) 
     c. John’s walk was slow. 
 
The role of adverbial modifiers to act as predicates of the event argument is reflected in the 
applicability of the corresponding adjectives to event nominalizations, as in (2c). 
      Tropes, for example Socrates’ wisdom as opposed to wisdom in general, are particularized 
properties, manifestations of properties in individuals. Socrates’ wisdom thus is the particular 
manifestation of wisdom in Socrates and as such distinct from the wisdom of Plato. While the 
term ‘trope’ is a fairly recent (and somewhat misleading) term, introduced by Williams 
(1953), tropes had played an important role already as ‘accidents’ or ‘modes’ in Aristotelian 
metaphysics.
23
 They certainly have been considered part of the ontology of language much 
earlier than events, especially in medieval language-oriented philosophy (Aquinus, Ockham). 
Tropes have traditionally been considered the semantic values of referential NPs formed with 
adjective nominalizations such as Socrates’ wisdom or John’s happiness, or the redness of the 
apple (Strawson 1959, Woltersdorff 1970, Moltmann 2004, 2013b, Chap 2).  
        Just as for Davidson’s semantics of events, modifiers of adjectives motivate the view that 
tropes act as implicit arguments of adjectives (Moltmann 2009, 2013b). Modifiers of 
adjectives, at least to an extent, also occur as predicates of the corresponding relevant trope-
referring term: 
 
(3) a. Socrates is extremely wise. 
      b. Socrates’ wisdom is extreme. 
 
This means that wise describes a relation between wisdom tropes (manifestations of wisdom) 
and agents. Alternatively, degrees have been considered implicit arguments of adjectives, for 
the purpose of the semantics of comparatives and various measure-related constructions (two 
meters tall, extremely happy etc) (Cresswell 1977).  
    Also numbers have been considered part of the ontology of natural language. Most 
prominently, Frege (1884) had argued that natural language permits reference to numbers as 
objects, by appealing to statements such as (4): 
                                                          
2
 They continue to play the same sort of role in the work of Neo-Aristotelians such as Lowe (2006). 
3
 Tropes are also called ‘abstract particulars’ in Campbell  (1990) and ‘cases’ in Woltersdorff (1970). 
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(4) The number of planets is eight. 
 
Frege took (4) to be an identity statement involving reference to numbers with both the 
subject term and the postcopula number word (an assumption that is problematic, as will be 
discussed later). 
     Finally, it is a common view that propositions as abstract mind- and language-independent 
objects that are truth bearers play a central role in the semantics of natural language (Stalnaker 
1984, Schiffer 2003). As the meanings of sentences, propositions are also meant to act as the 
semantic values of that-clauses and thus as arguments of predicates embedding that-clauses, 
such as attitude verbs as in (5a). Again quantifiers such as something as in (5b) and pronouns 
of the sort of that as in (5c), when they take the place of clausal complements seem to take 
propositions as semantic values: 
 
(5) a. John thinks that it is raining. 
      b. John thinks something. 
      c. Bill thinks that too. 
  
There are further proposition-like entities that seem to be part of the ontology of natural 
language, in particular non-worldly facts (as referents of terms of the sort the fact that S or 
factive that-clauses) (Fine 1982b, Asher 1993, Moltmann 2013b, Zucchi 1983). 
    Natural language also appears to involve variable objects, as the semantic values of terms 
of the sort the paper John needs to write, terms whose referential status appears reflected in 
their ability to support anaphora (Moltmann 2013b, to appear b):
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(6) The paper John needs to write must be 20 pages long. It cannot be any shorter or longer. 
 
Variable objects would be entities that have manifestations as ordinary objects in particular 
situations -- in the case of (6), situations satisfying John’s need. 
                                                          
44
 Anaphoric reference is also available relating to the indefinite in the discourse below:: 
 
(i) John needs to write a paper. It must be 20 pages long. 
 
This, however, is a case of modal subordination where a paper is not a referential term, but rather introduces into 
a subordinate modal contex, a discourse referent which can then serve as antecedent of a subsequent pronoun 
that occurs in the same modal context, at least on the standard analysis (see Section 8). In (6), by contrast, the 
definite stands for an object that incorporates the modal element, a variable object. 
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      In addition to the various ontological categories of abstract or derivative entities that 
natural language appears to permit reference to, natural language also seems to allow for 
terms to stand for merely intentional objects (of any categories), entities considered 
‘nonexistent’ by the speaker. That is, natural language appears to reflect a Meinoningian view 
of there being objects that fail to exist (Parsons 1980, Salmon 1987, 1998, Fine 1982a, Priest 
2005, Moltmann 2013a, 2016 a). Terms of the relevant sort may appear both in the subject 
position of negative existentials as in (7a) and in the object position of intentional verbs such 
as think as in (8a). In both positions, those terms allow for a replacement by pronouns and 
quantifiers as in (7b, c) and (8b, c), further supporting their referential status: 
 
(7) a. The building described in the book does not exist.  
     b. It has never existed.  
     c. A building described in the book does not exist. 
(8) a. John thought about a building described in the book. 
     b. John thought about it for a long time. 
     c. John thought about some building. 
 
Intentional objects as ‘nonexistent’ objects are considered particularly problematic (Inwagen 
2001). 
     Natural language also appears to allow for reference to plural entities, without imposing 
particular restrictions on their mereological composition, with the use of definite plurals and 
conjunctions (the things in the room, Obama and the Eiffeltower etc) (Link 1983). However, 
there are alternative views according to which such terms refer plurally to several individuals 
at once, rather than a single plural individual (Yi 2005, 2006, Oliver/Smiley 2013, Moltmann 
2016 b). 
    In addition for entities acting as semantic values of natural language expressions, entities 
may also be involved in the semantic structure of sentences as parameters that help determine 
the truth value of sentences or the proposition a sentence expresses. In particular, times and 
possible worlds (or perhaps situations, partial possible worlds) are generally taken to play that 
role. This goes along with the view that modals and tense act semantically as operators that 
may shift those parameter of evaluation.  
      Clearly, given such a range of entities, the ontology displayed by natural language differs 
from the sort of ontology that a philosopher may be willing to accept. But it may also differ 
from the ontology an ‘ordinary’ speaker of the language may be willing to accept when 
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reflecting upon what there really is. An ordinary speaker may hold various views when 
thinking about what sorts of things there are, what their general characteristics are and how 
they relate to each other, and may endorse or reject various ontological statements as a result 
of such reflections. It is therefore essential that natural language ontology make a distinction 
between statements based on philosophical reflection and linguistic data that are part of a 
nonphilosophical use of language. Natural language ontology concerns itself with the 
ontological categories and structures implicit in ‘ordinary’ statements of a nonphilosophical 
discourse, not those that form part of the content of philosophical or quasi-philosophical 
assertions. It concerns itself with the ontological categories and structures a speaker accepts 
when using a language, not those a speaker accepts when engaging in some form of 
philosophical reflection.  
        Of course, this general distinction calls for more precise criteria that distinguish the two 
sorts of linguistic material: linguistic data that reflect the ontological categories and structures 
implicit in natural language and linguistic data manifesting a speaker’s reflections. In 
particular it calls for criteria for characterizing the ontological categories and structures 
natural language involves and identifying what sorts of entities it is committed to.  In the 
history of metaphysics, linguistic data have of course often been taken into account, during 
some periods more than others (in medieval metaphysics, for example, linguistic data played a 
crucial role, as they did in early analytic philosophy). But in general such data were used, 
somewhat arbitrarily and unsystematically, in support of general philosophical intuitions that 
may have had other sources of support as well. 
    Given the subject matter of natural language ontology, one may also ask what the value of 
natural language ontology should be since it does not concern itself with what there really is. 
This is an issue will be addressed both in the next section and in Section 7.   
     Natural language ontology not only concerns itself not only with the categories of objects 
that the semantics of natural language commits itself to. It also deals with metaphysical 
notions of various sorts, such as part-whole relations (Moltmann 1997, 1998), constitution 
(Fine 2003, King 2006), causation (Swanson 2012), (time- and space-relative) existence (Fine 
2006, Moltmann 2013d), and existence of he past (the presentism debate) (Szabo 2007, Sider 
2006). But natural language ontology also has its limits, in the sense that it does not bear on 
all sorts of issues in metaphysics. Topics that it does not bear on include the existence of god, 
personhood, free will, and what entities are more fundamental than others 
     It should also be added that it also reasonable that some topics in metaphysics are best be 
addressed jointly, by taking into account both what is reflected in natural language and purely 
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philosophical or even other empirical considerations, for example questions in the ontology of 
the mind may benefit from taking into account both natural language and cognitive science. 
 
2. Ontology and metaphysics: some distinctions 
 
At this point few terminological and conceptual issues should be clarified regarding the 
project of natural language ontology.    
      First of all, the term ‘natural language ontology’ is generally used ambiguously, referring 
either to the discipline or its subject matter, the ontological categories, notions, and structures 
reflected in natural language. ‘The ontology of natural language’ tends to be used in the 
second sense. Throughout this paper, I will generally use the term ‘natural language ontology’ 
only, and in the first sense. 
     Second, there is a distinction generally made in philosophy between ontology and 
metaphysics.  Given that distinction, ontology concerns itself only with what there is, whereas 
metaphysics also concerns itself with the nature of things. In view of that distinction, ‘natural 
language metaphysics’ would be a more appropriate term than ‘natural language ontology’. 
However, the latter has established itself more widely and for that reason alone should better 
be the one to use.
5
 
     Third, it is important to distinguish different projects in metaphysics in order to allow 
natural language ontology to obtain its proper recognition. One distinction that has been made 
in the literature is Strawson’s (1959) well-known distinction between descriptive and 
revisionary metaphysics by. As Strawson characterizes it, ‘descriptive metaphysics‘ has as its 
aim to uncover our shared conceptual scheme, whereas revisionary aims to conceive of a 
better ontology than how we ordinarily conceive of things. Whereas descriptive metaphysics 
aims to develop an ontological theory that would be reflected in our common sense intuitions, 
revisionary metaphysics develops an ontological theory for a particular purpose (such as 
perhaps the development of scientific theories). Clearly, natural language ontology would fall 
under descriptive metaphysics, and in fact can be considered the pursuit of a particularly strict 
version of descriptive metaphysics, one that is entirely based on linguistically reflected 
intuitions. 
                                                          
5
 The term ‘natural language metaphysics’, though, is used by Emmon Bach in Bach (1986) and Chao/Bach 
(2011), papers that give an overview of various ontological categories generally posited in formal semantics at 
the time, without, however, relating to the philosophical traditions, issues, and debates. 
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   A somewhat different distinction has recently been made by Fine (to appear a), namely 
between ‘naïve’ metaphysics and ‘foundational‘ metaphysics. Naïve metaphysics concerns 
itself with how things appear to be, without trying to address the question of what there really 
is. The latter is what foundational metaphysics aims to do. Foundational metaphysics, though, 
presupposes naïve metaphysics, whose notions it in fact should aim to explain in more 
fundamental terms, as Fine argues. Naïve metaphysics is the metaphysics of appearance, and 
as such should not be guided by considerations of foundational metaphysics, but rather 
foundational metaphysics relies on naïve metaphysics in order to do its foundational work.  
     Natural language ontology obviously is part of naïve metaphysics. But of course, it is not 
‘naïve’ in the sense of concerning itself with what the ordinary person naively takes there to 
be. Rather, as part of the metaphysics of appearance, it deals with the ontological categories, 
notions, and structures that a deep and systematic analysis of language uncovers.
6
   
 
3. The ontology of natural language and the reflective ontology of speakers 
 
Philosophers that pursue natural language ontology either as a subject matter in itself or for 
the purpose of particular philosophical arguments generally follow a particular practice, 
making use of certain linguistic data but not others. That is, there are implicit assumptions 
regarding what sorts of data make a convincing case for an ontological notion to be reflected 
in natural language. Let us thus try to make more explicit the criteria that distinguish the 
linguistic data that would be indicative of the ontology of natural language from those that 
would be indicative, say, of the reflective ontology of speakers.  
 
3.1. Asserted and presupposed content: semantic selectional requirements 
 
One distinction that certainly plays a role is the distinction between assertions and 
presuppositions. Ontological generalizations that are presupposed by sentences ‘ordinary’ 
speakers use (that is, speakers when not engaging in philosophical debate) certainly qualify as 
a reflection of the ontology of natural language. By contrast, sentences that themselves make 
metaphysical assertions are hardly taken to be evidence for the ontology of natural language – 
and in fact philosophers generally do not make use of such sentences when appealing to 
                                                          
6
 Fine (p.c.) also uses the term ‘shallow metaphysics’ instead of ‘naïve metaphysics’, perhaps a better choice 
when it comes to natural language ontology. ‘Shallow metaphysics’ is the term I use, following Fine (p.c.), in 
Moltmann (2014b) for the branch of the metaphysics that natural language ontology belongs to. 
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natural language for the purpose of metaphysical arguments. Thus a statement such as (9a) 
would not be considered evidence for the distinctness of the categories of facts and events in 
the ontology of natural language, and so for the statements in (9b), (9c) and (9d): 
 
(9) a. Facts are not events.  
     b. There are properties. 
     c. Numbers are objects. 
     d. There are events. 
 
Statements of the sort in (9) would not be considered support for an ontological distinction 
between facts and events, for an ontological commitment to properties, for numbers being 
objects, or for an ontological commitment to events, as part of the ontology of natural 
language. Not even assertions regarding the ontological category of about particular objects, 
as below, could qualify: 
 
(10) a. The fact that it is raining is not an event. 
        b. The property of being wise is a property. 
        c. The number two is a number. 
        d. The rain is an event. 
 
The statements in (10) would hardly be appealed to when arguing for a distinction between 
events and facts or for an ontological commitment to properties, numbers or events. 
      Let us contrast these examples with the sorts of statements that have actually been used to 
argue for natural language supporting an ontological distinction. Thus, contrasts such as those 
between (11a) and (11b) and between (12a) and (12b) have been used to argue for an 
ontological distinction between facts and events (Vendler 1967, Asher 1993):  
 
(11) a. The rain lasted several days. 
       b. ??? The fact that it rained lasted several days. 
(12) a. John watched the rain. 
        b. ??? John watched the fact that it rained. 
 
      Contrasts such as those between (13a) and (13b), between (14a) and (14b), and between 
(15a) and (15b) have been used to argue for a fundamental distinction between material 
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objects and events with respect to how they relate to space and time (Hacker 1982, Cresswell 
1986, Fine 2006, Moltmann 2013d):   
 
(13) a. John’s arrival took place yesterday. 
        b. ??? John’s arrival existed yesterday. 
(14) a. ??? The building took place last year. 
       b. The building existed last year. 
(15) a. The party is tomorrow. 
       b. ??? The cake is tomorrow. 
 
       Contrasts such as between (16a) and (16b) and between (17a) and (17b) have been used 
in order to argue for an ontological distinction between actions and their (nonenduring) 
products (Twardowski 1911, Moltmann 2013b Chap 4, 2014b): 
 
(16) a. John’s claim is true. 
        b. ??? John’s speech act is true. 
(17) a. John kept / broke his promise. 
        b. ??? John kept / broke his speech act. 
 
     The reason why statements of the sort in (11) – (17) are considered relevant for natural 
language ontology is because such statements do not make metaphysical assertions, but rather 
carry metaphysical presuppositions, which here are conditions on the applicability of 
predicates to entities of particular ontological categories. Semantic selectional requirements or 
category restrictions imposed by predicates are one important source of data regarding the 
ontological categories reflected in natural language.
7
 
 
3.2. Identity statements and the trap of specificational sentences 
 
Another sort of sentence that is generally taken to be indicative of particular ontological 
categories being reflected in natural language is identity statements involving reference to 
instances of the category in question -- or rather what appear to be identity statements.  Thus, 
                                                          
7
 For a recent discussion of category mistakes and a defense of a presuppositional account of them see Magidor 
(2013).  
12 
 
Frege (1884) thought that statements such as (2) repeated below, would support the status of 
numbers as objects – in the ontology of natural language and, thus, as such: 
 
(18) The number of planets is eight. 
 
In this sentence, the number of planets a well as eight for Frege are referential terms, having 
the semantic function of standing for an object. It is significant that Frege did not cite 
sentences such (9c, 10c), which assert what for Frege (18) presupposes, namely that numbers 
are objects. In (18), the presupposition is not a selectional requirement of a predicate, though. 
Rather, for Frege, it is tied to two singular terms for numbers flanking the identity predicate. 
   Similar examples appear to be evidence for entities such as beliefs, promises, reasons, and 
facts being propositions, the semantic values of that clauses. Thus, the apparent identity 
statements below appear to show that what a that-clause stands for, a proposition, can be a 
belief (19a), a promise (19b), a reason (19c), or a fact (19d): 
 
(19) a. John’s belief is that he will return. 
       b. John’s promise is that he will help Mary. 
       c. The reason why John left is that he wanted to avoid being interrogated. 
       d. The fact John mentioned is that the meeting is over. 
 
The examples in (19) are problematic, however, as support for the ontological views for 
which they have been used. Such sentences, as has been argued, are better not viewed as 
identity statements, but instead as so-called ‘specificational sentences’ (Higgins 1973, 
Romero 2005), that is, as being of the same type as sentences of the sort in (20): 
 
(20) What John is is happy. 
 
In specificational sentences, it is generally agreed, neither the subject nor the postcopula 
expression functions as a referential term. Rather than expressing the identity of objects, 
specificational sentences have been regarded as either expressing the identity of semantic 
values of a higher type or, more commonly as expressing question-answer relations, with the 
subject being a concealed question and the postcopula expression an elided answer.
8
 On the 
                                                          
8
 The first view, the Identity Theory, is due to Jacobson (1994), the second view, the Question-Answer Theory,  
to den Dikken et al. (2000). 
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latter view, (18) would make a statement roughly of the sort ‘how many planets are there – 
there are eight planets’ (Moltmann 2013a, b), (19a) of the sort ‘what does John believe’ – 
John believes that he will return, (19b) of the sort ‘what does John promise? – John promises 
that he will help Mary’, (19c) of the sort ‘why did John leave – John left in order not to be 
interrogated’ (Pryor 2007), and (19d) of the sort ‘what fact did John mention? – John 
mentioned the fact that the meeting was over’. This then makes sentences (19) compatible 
with the view that number words such as eight stand for plural properties rather than number 
objects (Moltmann 2013a), the view that beliefs are not propositions (but rather propositional 
attitudes or mental states, the common view in the philosophy of mind), that promises are not 
propositions (but products of illocutionary acts, Twardowski 1911, Moltmann 2013b Chap 4, 
2014a), the view that that reasons are not propositions (Pryor 2007), and the view that facts 
are not (true) propositions (Vendler 1972, Fine 1982b, Asher 1993, Zucchi 1983). 
 
3.3. Reifying terms and the core-periphery distinction 
 
There are related subject-predicate sentences that appear to make the same point as the 
apparent identity statements in (18) and (19): 
 
(21) a. Eight is a number that is divisible by two and four. 
       b. That he will return is a belief that John certainly has. 
       c. That he will help is a promise John frequently made. 
       d. That he wants to avoid being interrogated is not a reason for John to leave. 
     
The sentences in (21) differ from the sentences in (10) in that their focus is on the material 
after the head noun and not the noun itself, which means that the sentences in (21)  
presupposes, rather than asserts, that the subject referent falls under the sortal.  
    There are good grounds for taking the predicate-initial sortal in (21) not to be an ordinary 
predicate, but a reifying device (Moltmann 2013b Chap. 6), the very same function it has in 
the examples in (22) or even more obviously those in (23): 
 
(22) a. the number eight 
       b. John’s belief that he will return 
       c. John’s promise that he will help 
       d. the reason that he wants to avoid being interrogated 
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(23) a. the concept horse 
       b. the truth value true 
       c. the property of wisdom 
 
Reifying sortals as in (22) and in (23) serve not to attributing a property to an object, but to 
introduce a ‘new’ object on the basis of nonreferential linguistic (uses of) expressions (such as 
nouns, adjectives, or, arguably, that-clauses) (Moltmann 2013b, Chap. 6). Though reifying 
terms are part of English, they can be taken at best as evidence for certain types of objects 
playing a role in a derivative part of language, which tends to be used for a more or less 
philosophical sort of discourse. Reifying terms are generally not taken as a reflection of 
objects being part of the ontology of natural language. Frege, for example, did not appeal to 
them when arguing for numbers and truth values being objects.  
      This raises a more general issue for natural language ontology. Natural language generally 
can be extended with terms (reifying terms or proper names, for example) for various sorts of 
‘philosophical entities’, which some philosophers may accept, but that one would not consider 
part of the implicit ontology of natural language, the ontology any speaker accepts when using 
the language. Such terms in a sense belong to the periphery of language, not the core of 
language.
9
 The ontology reflected in the periphery of a language needs to be distinguished 
from that reflected in its core, the ontology any speaker accepts when using the language: 
 
(24) Ontology and the Core-Periphery Distinction 
       The ontology of natural language is reflected in the core of language, not its periphery. 
 
Certainly, the periphery of language also has a semantics, and it also reflects an ontology, 
with its referential terms standing for entities of some sort. Using Fine’s (to appear a) notion, 
this ontology would be part of the subject the metaphysics of ‘appearance’ and thus of naïve 
                                                          
9
 The terms core and periphery recall a different and important distinction that Chomsky (1986) made regarding 
the syntactic structure of languages. For Chomsky,  the core of a language consist in what is determined by the 
(innate) Universal Grammar, its universal principles together with the way its parameters are set for that 
language, whereas the periphery consist in idiosyncratic rules unique to that language, rules added  on in the 
historical development of the language. Chomsky’s distinction does not in any way coincide with the present 
one. Clearly, the formation of new philosophical terms may take place entirely within what Chomsky would call 
the core of language, as is presumably the case for reifying terms.  
       One might speculate that the ontology associated with what I call of ‘the core of language’ forms part of 
Universal Grammar when supplemented by cognitive ontology, whereas the ontology reflected in the periphery 
in my sense forms part of the periphery of language in Chomsky’s sense. However, ontology itself may consist 
not so much in a set of categories, but rather in conditions for generating objects from given ones (for examples 
principles of abstraction discussed in Section 6), and the so generated objects may be part of what is reflected in 
the periphery in my sense. 
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metaphysics – and that even if the extension of the language concerns in fact terms of 
foundational metaphysics. 
 
4. Criteria of ontological commitment in the core of language 
 
The issue of the ontological commitments of natural language is the issue of what categories 
of objects are part of the ontology of natural language and thus play a role in the semantic 
structure of natural language sentences.   
     There are various ways for entities to play a role in the semantics of natural language. 
Clearly, the most prominent one and the one the philosophical literature generally focuses on 
is captured by Frege’s criterion for objecthood. According to that criterion, an object is what a 
referential term may stand for. Frege’s criterion of objecthood goes along with his context 
principle, which ties the syntactic role of an expression to its semantic contribution to the 
composition of the meaning of the sentence.   
      The applicability of Frege’s criterion obviously hinges on the notion of a referential term, 
as a syntactic role of occurrences of expressions in natural language sentences. What 
characterizes the occurrence of an expression in a sentence as a referential term?  Note that 
not all NPs can act as referential terms since NPs can occur also as predicative complements 
and as complements of intensional transitive verbs such as need and look for. There is no 
agreement how exactly to characterize that syntactic role of an occurrence of an expression 
acting as a referential term. It is mainly philosophers, including Frege, that have proposed 
various criteria for referential terms, such as the ability of flanking the identity predicate, the 
ability of supporting anaphora, and the ability of being replaceable by a quantifier (Hale 
1987).
10
 Clearly the role of an expression to act as a referential term is central for natural 
language ontology, and more generally the view that the ontology of natural language 
systematically relates to syntactic structure. The criteria for referential terms that have been 
proposed are not unproblematic, however. 
      First of all, not all sorts of quantifiers that are able to replace an occurrence of an 
expression in a sentence are indicative of that expression acting as a referential term. In fact, 
there is a class of special quantifiers that characteristically are able to replace nonreferential 
occurrences of expressions. In English, this class consists of quantifiers like something, 
                                                          
10
 Quine (1948) took quantification to be the criterion of ontological commitment, with his statement ‘to be is to 
be the value of a bound variable’. 
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everything, nothing, and several things. They can replace predicative complements and 
complements of intensional transitive verbs as well as that-clauses: 
 
(25) a. Socrates is wise. 
       b. Socrates is something admirable. 
(26) a. John needs a race horse. 
       b. John needs something expensive. 
(27) a. John claimed that S. 
        b. John claimed something shocking. 
 
Such special quantifiers do not act as ordinary first-order or higher-order quantifiers, but are 
better regarded as nominalizing quantifiers  introducing a ‘new’ domain of entities into the 
semantic structure of sentences, entities that would be referents of corresponding 
nominalizations (wisdom in (25a), the satisfaction of John’s need in (26b), and John’s claim 
in (27c)) (Moltmann 2003, 2013b). 
    Some philosophers have argued that neither reference nor quantification in natural language 
is existence-entailing and thus ontologically committing. That is because NPs in the role of 
referential terms and quantifiers appear to be able to stand for merely intentional objects that 
the speaker considers nonexistent. The relevant examples involve NPs as subjects of negative 
existentials as well as complements of intentional verbs, as mentioned earlier in the examples 
(7a) and (8a). This suggests that NPs acting as referential terms and quantifiers are not after 
all indicative of the ontological commitment of the language, but only NPs of which the 
existence predicate is true. However, there are in fact a lot of constraints on when NPs are 
able to stand for merely intentional objects. Their occurrence is restricted to certain predicates 
such as existence predicates and intentional predicates. Most predicates are existence-
entailing, requiring entities considered real by the speaker. That said, the data with negative 
existentials and intentional verbs indicate that intentional objects, however they may be 
conceived, form part of the ontology of natural language. Otherwise, the semantics of 
referential, quantificational, and anaphoric NPs with predicates of existence as well as 
intentional verbs could hardly be accounted for in a compositional fashion.  
    The notion of a referential term raises the question whether categories other than noun 
phrases can play the syntactic role of referential terms. That-clauses are a case in point. While 
that-clauses do not refer in the way referential NPs do, they have been considered referential 
terms standing for propositions (Frege 1918/9, Schiffer 2003), though that view is 
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controversial (as discussed, for example, in Moltmann 2013b, Chap 4., to appear a) (see 
Section 7).  
     Entities may play other roles in the semantic structure of sentences than as semantic values 
of referential NPs and quantifiers. First of all, they may act as implicit arguments of 
predicates, as is the case with events on the Davidsonian semantics of verbs and with tropes 
on an analogous semantics of adjectives. Besides event and trope arguments of verbs and 
adjectives, other sorts of implicit arguments have been postulated. They include degrees as 
arguments of adjectives (say heights for tall or degrees of happiness for happy), contextual 
standards for various sorts of gradable expressions (for example a standard height for tall), 
and modes of presentations for referential terms in sentences embedded under attitude verbs 
(and perhaps elsewhere).
11
 
       As arguments of predicates, degrees, contextual standards, and modes of presentation 
would have the status of objects, yet the Fregean criterion fails to apply to them, in that, in the 
core of language, there are not really explicit referential terms able to refer to them, or in fact 
other ways for ordinary speakers to make them explicit. In fact there is a view, though so far 
little discussed explicitly, according to which the different ways in which entities are involved 
in the semantic structure of natural language reflects differences in ontological status, or 
‘objecthood’. Roughly, on that view, entities for which there are underived nouns enjoy full 
ontological status (material objects, persons, for example), entities primarily acting as implicit 
arguments and only derivatively as semantic values of referential terms enjoy only a 
secondary ontological status (events and tropes), and entities only playing the role of implicit 
arguments a lesser ontological status yet (degrees, contextual standards, modes of 
presentation). 
    There is another important role entities may play in the semantic structure, namely as 
parameters of contextual evaluation, as part of the context of utterance which serves to 
identify the meaning of an indexical expression, or as parameters relative to which a sentence 
is evaluated as true or false. Sometime entities that may act as parameters relevant for 
evaluation of sentences may also act as semantic values of referential terms. This is the case 
                                                          
11 Modes of presentation roughly, are ways an agent views an object. The semantic need for modes of 
presentations can be illustrated with a famous example by Kripke. Suppose Pierre visits London on two different 
occasions, without realizing it is the same city he is visiting. On one occasion London strikes him as pretty, on 
the other as ugly.  In that case, both (ia) and (ib) can be considered true, namely when involving different modes 
of presentation as part of the semantic value of the embedded sentence: 
 
(i) a. Pierre believes that London is pretty. 
     b. Pierre believes that London is ugly. 
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for times, but not so for worlds and situations. Possible worlds and situations have hardly 
been considered semantic values of referential terms of the core of language.
12
 
       Possible worlds have played a central role in formal semantics in the tradition deriving 
from Montague (1973), for the formal construal of linguistic content as well as specifically 
the semantics of modals and conditionals (Stalnaker 1984). More recently, situations, as 
partial possible worlds, have been invoked in semantics for various purposes and in various 
ways: as a replacement of possible worlds for the purpose of obtaining a finer notion of 
content (Barwise / Perry 1983), as well as the analysis of particular constructions such as 
perception reports (Barwise/Perry 1983), conditionals and generic sentences (Kratzer 
2007/2014), and part-related expressions (Moltmann 1997, 2005). Moreover, situations have 
been taken to form the domain of certain quantifiers, namely adverbs of quantification such as 
sometimes or frequently (Berman 1987, Kratzer 2007/2014). In addition, situations have been 
invoked as reference or resource situations associated with the evaluation of noun phrases, in 
order to account for the restriction on the domain of quantificational NPs and definite NPs, 
including pronominal anaphora, on an E-type account on which they stand for definite 
NPs.
13,14
  
      
5. Ontological and syntactic categories  
 
The roles of events in the semantics of verbs and deverbal nominalizations (laughter, walk) 
and that of tropes in the semantics of adjectives and deadjectival nominalizations (wisdom, 
happiness) raises the general issue of whether there is a systematic correlation between 
ontological categories and syntactic categories. Such a correlation would go along with the 
very old observation that nouns, at least underived ones, are to a great extent associated with 
substances, whereas adjectives are associated with tropes. In the history of metaphysics as 
well as linguistics (or ‘grammar’) such a correlation has sometimes been endorsed (which is 
                                                          
12
  The noun situation itself is both a technical and non-technical term. In the latter case it imposes particular 
constraints on spatial continuity, say, that situations as partial worlds of evaluation need not be subject to.  
 
13
 For an overview of the role of situations in semantics see Kratzer (2007/2014).  
 
14
 Situations have yet been invoked for yet another semantic role, namely as truth makers of sentences, in Fine’s 
(to appear b) recent truthmaker semantics. As truthmakers, situations or states, as Fine calls them, are entities 
wholly relevant for the truth of a sentence, but they do not form the domain of quantifiers or act as referents of 
referential terms in the language. 
      Also events and tropes have been posited for the truthmaker role (Moltmann 2007).  Even in that role, 
events and tropes may be conceived as semantic values of expressions such as nominalizations or adverbial 
modifiers. 
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why universals that have tropes as instances are also called ‘adjectival universals’ and 
universals that have substances as instances ‘substantival universals’).15 However, one 
problem is that the correlation is not strict, at least not for nouns, which generally include 
nouns for all sorts of entities (Szabo 2015). Moreover, the view is challenged by the fact that 
there are languages that fail to display certain syntactic categories or any syntactic categories 
at all (Gill 1999). If nonetheless there is a correlation of some sort, it would indicate either 
that the lexical content of particular syntactic categories reflects the nature of the entities of 
particular ontological categories or that the syntactic roles of expressions of that category 
have a semantics that reflects the nature of the ontological category, say as ontologically 
dependent entities (tropes, events) as opposed to ontologically independent entities 
(substances). 
    Another syntactic category distinction that appears to reflect an ontological distinction is 
the mass-count distinction. In general, count nouns appear to apply to entities that have a 
boundary or some form of integrity, whereas count nouns apply to quantities, entities that fail 
to have a boundary or other form of integrity (Moltmann 1997, 1998). There are a range of 
sell-known exceptions to that generalization, of course. Furniture and police force are mass 
nouns in English, and amount and quantity are count nouns. Therefore the mass-count 
distinction may in fact reflect a cognitive distinction or a distinction in perspective rather than 
an ontological distinction.  
        One approach to the semantic content of the mass-count distinction characterizes mass 
nouns and count nouns in terms of extensional mereologcal properties of their extensions 
(homogeneity, atomicity) (Link 1986),  possibly relative to a context (Rothstein 2010). 
Another approach characterizes the mass-count distinction semantically in terms of a notion 
of a contextually given and possibly merely conceived integrity (Moltmann 1997, 1998). Yet 
another approach takes the mass domain to be a pre-individuated domain not consisting of 
(single) entities at all (Laycock 2006). All the semantic characterizations of the mass-count 
distinction face an important crosslinguistic challenge in that there are languages (e.g. 
Chinese) that lack a mass-count distinction and use classifiers instead. See Doetjes (2012) for 
an overview of the mass-count distinction across languages. 
 
6. Pleonastic or light objects in the ontology of natural language 
 
                                                          
15
 This matches the Aristotelian four-category ontology, which was fairly standard in the middle ages and was 
still recently pursued by Lowe (2006). See also Moltmann (2013b) for a more linguistic discussion. 
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One important general approach to the wealth of referential terms in natural language is the 
view that some referential terms involve light entities, entities introduced on the basis of 
particular sentences or conditions not involving them. One version of that approach is the 
view that referential terms may stand for pleonastic entities (Schiffer 2003, 2006). Pleonastic 
entities are entities  introduced by particular sorts of inferences, namely inferences from 
statements not involving the referential term in question to statements involving it, inferences 
of what Schiffer calls ‘something-from-nothing inferences’. The referential term thus stands 
for an entity introduced by language itself, an entity that has just those properties attributed in 
virtue of ‘something-to-nothing inferences’. Schiffer applies the view to property-denoting 
terms as well as to what he takes to be proposition-denoting terms, that is, that-clauses, and he 
takes it to also account for event reference. 
     Given the pleonastic view, property-denoting terms stand for pleonastic entities introduced 
by inferences such as from (28a) to (28b): 
 
(28) a. Socrates is wise. 
        b. Socrates has the property of being wise. 
 
Similarly, propositions as semantic values of that-clauses are obtained from inferences such 
as from (28a) to (28b): 
 
(29) a. It is raining. 
        b. That it is raining is true. 
 
Pleonastic entities are entities whose only properties are those attributed to them on the basis 
of inferences as in (28) or (29). Pleonastic entities thus permit a straightforward reduction in 
the sense of not leading to new truths (truths that could not be stated without reference to 
those entities). 
        What is attractive about the pleonastic view is that it preserves the view that referential 
terms stand for entities while trying to make sense of the derivative, language-related nature 
of some of those entities. There are a range of challenges, though, associated with the view, 
which I will only briefly mention. First of all, the view easily overgenerates, since not every 
‘something-from-nothing’ inference should generate a new object.  
       Second, it is not obvious that all the relevant properties of what are considered pleonastic 
entities can be obtained by a ‘something-from-nothing’ inference. For propositions, properties 
21 
 
not derivable that way include being partially true and being widely believed (both of which 
cannot be attributed to a proposition as an inference from a sentence not making reference to a 
proposition as in (29). In fact there are also various sorts of nominalizations that the 
pleonastic is meant to apply to that allow for predicates that could not be introduced by a 
something-from-nothing inference. Thus, Socrates wisdom may be deep, admirable, or hard to 
describe, properties hardly attributable just as a matter of an inference from a sentence not 
making reference to Socrates’ wisdom. In fact, the pleonastic account is inapplicable to 
tropes, attitudinal objects, and events, which are concrete, fully specific entities whose nature 
is not fixed by inferences introducing terms for them (Moltmann 2007, 2013b Chap 1).  
     Another issue is that the pleonastic account is restricted to terms that are, in one way or 
another, syntactically or morphologically derived from an expression that can figure in 
sentences in which no reference to the entity in question is made. This is the case for 
nominalizations, that-clauses as well as complex terms of the sort the property of wisdom. 
However, this is not always the case, for example not for events, to which the view is also 
meant to apply. For events, the view would exploit the alternation between adverbial 
constructions as in (30a), premises of ‘something-from-nothing’-inferences, and sentences in 
which the same expression acts as a predicate, as in (30b): 
 
(30) a. John walked slowly. 
        b. John’s walk was slow. 
 
However, events are not always tied to deverbal nominalization (fire, war, incident etc).:
16
 
      While the pleonastic account may not systematically apply to nominalizations that stand 
for abstract or minor entities, it appears to have particular plausibility for reifying terms as in 
(22) and (23), as complex terms introducing entities on the basis of a nonreferential 
expression with which they are formed (Moltmann 2013b, Chap. 6). 
      Somewhat related to the theory of pleonastic entities is the view that some referential 
terms stand for entities obtained by abstraction in the Fregean sense (Frege 1884, Wright 
1983, Hale 1987).
17
 Again this is a view according to which certain terms stand for entities 
                                                          
16
 A different version of the pleonastic account has been developed by Thomasson (2014), with an application to 
ordinary objects. That account would not be restricted to derived terms and permits a greater range of predicate 
applying to the newly introduced term. 
 
17
 Also somewhat related is the view according to which certain referential terms and quantifiers do not stand for 
objects but play only a role in inferences, for the purpose of conveying focus-related information (Hofweber 
2007). 
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whose intrinsic properties are determined by the method of their introduction. The 
abstractionist account is best known from Frege’s introduction of natural numbers on the basis 
of equinumerous concepts. However, Kim’s (1976) account of events is in fact of the very 
same nature (Moltmann 2013c). Kim’s account consists in giving existence and identity 
conditions for an event [d, P, t] obtained from an object d, a property P, and a time t: 
 
(32) For individuals d, d’, properties P, P’, and times t, t’, 
       [1] [d, P, t] exists iff P holds of d at t. 
       [2] [d, P, t] = [d', P', t'] iff d = d', P = P', t = t'. 
 
Since on that account, events have no other intrinsic properties that what is specified by their 
method of introduction, (32) does not permit events to have causal roles, a spatial location, or 
a specific manifestation. For such reasons, it is generally agreed that Kim’s account captures 
(nonworldly) facts rather events.  
       Kim’s account may have an additional application besides to facts, namely to the implicit 
Davidsonian arguments of certain stative verbs. Stative verbs such as own, know, believe, and 
weigh, it has been argued, take ‘Kimean’ or ‘abstract’ states as arguments, entities on a par 
with nonwordly facts (Maienborn 2007, Moltmann 2013c). Unlike the pleonastic account, the 
abstractionist account does not impose conditions on the form of the relevant referential term 
and the contexts in which the term may occur. Thus, it permits implicit arguments of 
predicates to be entities obtained by abstraction in the way of (32). 
 
7. The importance of natural language ontology 
 
Why should natural language ontology be pursued? What is gained by uncovering the 
ontological categories and structures reflected in natural language? These questions will be 
raised particularly by philosophers who reject the types of entities seemingly reflected in 
natural language, in favor of what are considered more fundamental categories of entities, 
categories that are supposed to make up reality and are the only ones needed in a full 
description of the world. 
     There are not only good reasons to pursue the project of natural language ontology for its 
own sake, there are also grounds to doubt that foundational metaphysics can be pursued 
entirely independently of the ontology reflected in natural language. As Fine (to appear a) has 
emphasized, it is important to establish what exactly it is that needs to be accounted for in 
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more fundamental terms if foundational metaphysics is being pursued. Natural language 
ontology can be viewed a systematic pursuit of descriptive ontology in the sense of Strawson 
(1959), as the project that aims to uncover the ontology we implicitly accept. But rather than 
taking as the basis of that project the judgments that are part of a shared conceptual scheme 
(and a few linguistic examples here and there), natural language ontology takes as its basis 
linguistically reflected intuitions by making full use of the methods and established 
generalizations of linguistic semantics and its interface with syntax.  For a range of issues in 
metaphysics, the linguistic reflections may just be the best indication of how we, implicitly, 
conceive of things.   
     Many philosophers dismiss natural language as a good basis for pursuing metaphysics 
because they take it to be obvious that natural language involves too rich and problematic an 
ontology, say a rich ontology of abstract objects, with terms referring to properties, 
propositions, numbers, and degrees. Also in regard to such an attitude, the pursuit of natural 
language ontology has an important task, namely the investigation and clarification what 
ontological categories, notions, and structures natural language actually involves. This is 
important because the ontology of natural language often turns out to be quite different from 
what philosophers take it to be.  
       Here are some examples of such a discrepancy. One of them concerns the rich ontology 
of abstract objects that natural language is supposed to display, an ontology supposedly 
including in its core such entities as properties, propositions, numbers, and degrees. This view 
of the ontology of natural language picture may be fundamentally mistaken. Thus, I have 
argued in Moltmann (2013b) that natural language is much more particularist, involving in its 
core no reference to abstract objects. Instead it involves reference to a great range of different 
sorts of tropes or trope-related entities or else to kinds of tropes, entities such as ‘wisdom’ or 
‘happiness’. Kinds (semantic values of bare plurals and mass nouns) are themselves 
considered pluralities of (possible or actual) particulars. Thus, instead of referring to an 
abstract object that is a property, the bare mass noun wisdom, stands for the plurality of all the 
particular wisdom manifestations. Moreover, instead of referring to a number as an abstract 
object, the number of planets refers to a number trope, the instantiation of the property of 
being eight in the plurality of the planets. Instead of referring to a degree, the extent of John’s 
anger refers to a quantitative trope etc.  Only in the periphery of language, with complex, 
quasi-technical terms involving sortals for abstract objects such as the property of being wise, 
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the number eight, and the degree of John’s anger, does natural language permit reference to 
abstract objects, such as properties, numbers, and degrees.
18
 
       Another important case of a discrepancy between the ontology philosophers take natural 
language to involve and the one it arguably really reflects concerns propositions (Moltmann 
2003, 2013b). Many philosophers (and linguists) take it for granted that that-clauses in the 
complement position of attitude verbs are referential terms and as such stand for propositions, 
the abstract meanings of sentences (Stalnaker 1984, Schiffer 2003). Propositions, on that 
view, will then act as arguments of a two place-attitudinal relation between agents and 
propositions and thus serve as the contents or objects of attitudes. However, linguistically, it is 
in fact far from obvious that that-clauses act as referential terms, one reason being that that-
clause do not generally permit a replacement by an explicit proposition-referring term even 
when the attitude verbs accepts NPs as complements  (while John thought that S and John 
thought something are acceptable, John thought the proposition that S is not). Moreover, 
natural languages in their core generally lack explicit proposition-referring terms. Terms of 
the sort John thought that S, John’s belief that S, or John’s promise that S certainly are part of 
the core of English, but they have a range of properties not shared by propositions and are 
better taken to stand for entities of a different sort – ‘products’ (Twardowski 1911) or better 
‘attitudinal objects’ (Moltmann 2003, 2013b Chap. 4, to appear a). 
     Such discrepancies show how important it is to first clarify what sort of ontology natural 
language actually involves before rejecting it.  
      The ontology that natural language reflects is a subject matter that is of interest also in 
itself. It goes along with way we implicitly conceive of certain general aspects of the world  
and it reflects, at least in part, our cognitive faculty. In addition the ontology of natural 
language may provide answers to a range of philosophical issues, not just as part of a 
particular descriptive metaphysical approach to them.  This may be so particularly regarding 
the nature of propositional attitudes and the semantics of attitude reports, where natural 
language appears to display a much less familiar ontology of attitudinal objects given standard 
ontological views.   
     Of course, the ontological structures that natural language displays need not be the right 
one and certain not the fundamental ones. But it is important to find out what they are before 
rejecting natural language as a guide to ontology.  
                                                          
18
 In fact, even that picture is simplified. The category of tropes reflected in natural language turns out to be 
considerably richer than the category philosophers generally make reference to, for example by distinguishing a 
quantitative trope such as John’s height from a trope that is John’s tallness, and a trope that is John’s strength 
from a trope that is John’s weakness (Moltmann 2009, 2013b). 
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8. Further issues 
 
Natural language ontology raises very particular issues that do not as such arise with 
metaphysics pursued in a context of purely philosophical interests.   
      Most importantly, the ontology of natural language may be driven in part by requirements 
of the use of language, rather than just how things are or rather how they are conceived to be. 
In fact, there are some theoretical developments in semantics that aim at a part of ontology 
that is specifically language- or discourse-driven.  
      One such development was already mentioned, namely the theory of pleonastic entities, 
which takes certain natural language terms to have the role of introducing entities by way of 
inferences from statements not involving them. 
      An example of a discourse-related quasi-ontological notion is that of a discourse referent 
outlined in Karttunen (1976), a notion that gave rise to subsequent developments of dynamic 
semantics. Discourse referents, as Karttunen describes it, are introduced by unbound 
anaphoric pronouns such as he below, which will stand for a discourse referent, an entity 
partially specified only as a man and having sat down (in relevant circumstances): 
 
(33) A man might come in. He might sit down.  
 
Discourse referents have been attributed a quasi-ontological status as objects, even if 
individuated just by the flow of information in the discourse, by Landmann (1986).  However, 
later development of dynamic semantics generally do not adhere to a (quasi-) ontological 
view of discourse referents, but take them to be representations in a discourse representation 
structure (Kamp 1981), or else complex semantic values partly composed of actual objects (in 
circumstances) (Heim 1982 and subsequent work). 
     Entities somewhat like discourse referents have been posited also for the semantics of 
sentences involving intentional identity, as below: 
 
(34) John thinks that student broke in. Mary thinks that he stole her book. 
 
Again the intentional objects posited here have been taken to be individuated by the flow of 
information in the discourse, not just the attitudes of the described agents (Edelberg 1986). 
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      Another theoretical development in semantics that argues for a discourse-driven part of 
ontology is the theory of parts and wholes of Moltmann (1997, 2005). The view pursued there 
is that the pluralities and quantities involve a part-whole structure based not only on a part-
whole relation among entities, but also the notion of an integrated whole. This, so the view, 
they share with individuals, which themselves typically are intrinsic integrated wholes. Unlike 
individuals, pluralities and quantities generally have a part-whole structure that depends on 
information given in the discourse, in particular the information content of the terms used to 
refer to them. Thus it will depend on whether a quantity of gold is described as consisting of 
maximal subquantities sharing a property or relating to another object whether a predicate like 
compare is applicable: 
 
(35) a. ??? John compared the gold. 
       b. John compared the gold in the different boxes. 
       c. John compared the gold of the three rings. 
 
Compare requires an argument that consists of integrated wholes but is not itself an integrated 
whole in the situation of reference. This condition may be fulfilled by pluralities or else 
quantities consisting of parts that have been described as maximal subquantities sharing a 
property or relating to another object. This means it is a condition to be fulfilled by an 
information-driven part structure. The notion of such an information-based situated part 
structure is, on that view, central for the semantics of part-structure-sensitive predicates such 
as compare as well as part-structure-sensitive modifiers such as individual and whole (as in 
the individual students and the whole collection).  The semantically relevant part structures of 
pluralities and quantities thus are those they have in the situation of reference, which is 
largely driven by the information given by the expressions used and well as the contribution 
of part structure modifiers such as individual and whole. 
     Another issue that natural language ontology specifically raises is the question of the 
crosslinguistic validity of ontological generalizations that may have been made on the basis of 
a particular language. In this regard, two things can be said.  
      First of all, crosslinguistic research in semantics as such is only a very recent 
development. Semantics until recently had  restricted itself to English or some other European 
languages. Crosslinguistic work on ontological topics, in particular; had hardly been pursued.  
     Second, there should be good reasons to assume that ontological categories, notions, and 
structures are universal. Certainly, if the ontology of natural language is based on a shared 
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cognitive faculty, there would be the very same reason to assume that it is universal as there 
are to assume that human languages are based on a shared universal grammar, a core 
assumption of generative linguistics. As in generative syntax, it certainly is reasonable and 
fruitful to pursue the view that a deeper analysis of different languages will reveal universal 
features of the ontology of natural language – just as a deeper analysis of English, as was 
mentioned, generally reveals a different ontological structure than what philosophers 
generally thought natural language involves While a particular language may not display a 
particular category of objects in its terms, predicates or operators, it is reasonable to assume 
that the categories a language may display come from a universal inventory that is part of our 
cognitive ontology or perhaps a shared number of ontological operations that may generate 
them.  
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